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In this article, we investigate the effect of brand divestments on firm value. We integrate two
common motives for focus-increasing brand divestitures—global branding and refocusing on
core businesses—in a single common framework. In particular, we investigate the effects of
divesting local/regional/global brands in core businesses and local/regional/global brands in
non-core businesses on firm value. Analyzing 205 divestment announcements in the global food
and beverages industry, we find that, in most cases, brand divestments destroy firm value. Only
when firms divest local or regional brands in non-core businesses is the effect on firm value
positive. Copyright © 2014 Strategic Management Society.
INTRODUCTION
Many multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in
the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry, such
as Unilever, Procter & Gamble, Nestle, and Diageo,
own brand portfolios that span multiple country and
industry markets. Starting around the early 1990s,
these companies expanded their portfolios through
acquisitions and new brand introductions in multiple
geographies and industries. This was done to gener-
ate growth by reaching almost anyone around the
globe. It led to a profusion of brands, most of them
regional or national, with many brands making only
a small contribution to companies’ bottom lines. For
example, Unilever managed a portfolio of 1,600
brands in 1999, with 80 percent of these brands
generating less than 10 percent of their proﬁts
(Kumar, 2003).
From a management viewpoint, the proliferation
of brands led to high costs and managerial complex-
ity (Hill, Ettenson, and Tyson, 2005). Furthermore, it
brought other ills, like inefﬁciencies in production,
distribution, and marketing (Knudsen et al., 1997;
Laforet and Saunders, 1999). The troubles of
supersizing brand portfolios were further exacer-
bated by a variety of retailer-related factors. The rise
of private label brands, difﬁculties in getting super-
market shelf space, and growing retailer power pro-
moted the need for a small set of strong brands rather
than a larger set of smaller ones. Pulling back from
gains achieved in the previous years, starting around
the mid-1990s, many ﬁrms realized the undesired
consequences of the proliferation of their brand port-
folios and started brand portfolio rationalization
(BPR) programs. A BPR program contains detailed
plans to divest particular brands from the brand port-
folio in order to release resources and reallocate
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them to meet the needs of the remaining brands in
the portfolio (Aaker, 2004).
Companies followed different strategies in divest-
ing brands, leading to diverse outcomes. P&G, for
example, deleted several food and beverage brands
to strengthen its focus on personal care and health
care brands. An increased focus on laundry, baby
care, hair care, and feminine protection brands let the
company become the global leader in these busi-
nesses (P&G, 2003; USA Today, 2006). P&G’s
growth from the brands they kept outweighed the
revenue losses from divested brands and, as a result,
the company experienced both top- and bottom-line
growth (P&G, 2004). In contrast with P&G’s strat-
egy of shifting focus across industries, Unilever
shifted its focus toward the top brands in its portfo-
lio. Unilever divested nearly 1,200 brands to enhance
its resources behind a core portfolio of 400 brands.
The divested brands were relatively small within the
overall portfolio in terms of revenues, were available
in only a few country markets, and had a small
customer base. Most of the retained top brands, e.g.,
Knorr soup, Calvin Klein perfumes, Dove soap, and
Magnum ice cream, had a strong international pres-
ence. The ﬁve-year makeover resulted in increased
brand focus, improved global buying, cost savings,
and debt reduction. Yet, it failed to deliver on its
promises in terms of revenues and shareholder value
(Unilever, 2004).
These and other brand divestment examples with
diverse outcomes made the uncertainty about the
value-creating effects of different types of focus-
increasing brand divestiture strategies grow. The
objective of the study reported in this article is to
empirically investigate the effects of two types of
focus-increasing brand divestitures (i.e., focus on
core industries versus focus on global brands) on
ﬁrm value.
Findings in two different research ﬁelds are rel-
evant for our study. First, the divestment literature
discusses divestitures of non-core business assets
(not speciﬁcally brand assets, though) to overcome
problems of overdiversiﬁcation (Haynes, Thompson,
and Wright, 2002) and to release resources to rein-
force core assets. It shows the value-enhancing effect
of these divestitures (Desai and Jain, 1999; John and
Ofek, 1995). Although this type of divestment is in
line with the P&G example discussed earlier, so far
the emphasis in these studies has been on tangible
assets. In our study, we focus on brands as intangible
assets. Second, the international branding literature
suggests the potential, mainly ﬁnancial, advantages
of deleting local brands and subsequently enhancing
released resources behind a few core, global brands
(Kapferer, 2002; Schuiling and Kapferer, 2004).
This is the strategy outlined in the Unilever case. So
far, this literature fails to provide empirical evidence
of possible ﬁrm value-enhancing effects.
We contribute to the international business litera-
ture by empirically investigating brand divestitures
from a multidisciplinary perspective. We integrate
the effects of the two focus-increasing strategies, i.e.,
to refocus on core businesses (‘the P&G approach’)
and the global branding strategy (‘the Unilever
approach’), into a single common framework. Meyer
(2006, 2009) argues that both forces are simultane-
ously redesigning conglomerates’ business activities
and discusses the potential beneﬁts of switching to a
so-called ‘global-focusing’ strategy. However, no
empirical evidence yet exists on the potential posi-
tive effects of this strategy on the ﬁrm value. Our
study addresses this gap and argues that the value-
creating effects of brand divestitures depend on the
divested brand’s industry relatedness (i.e., the relat-
edness of the brand to the primary or core business
activities of the company) and geographical scope
(i.e., the geographical reach of the brand in terms of
country markets). We distinguish four types of brand
divestitures, i.e., divesting: (1) a local brand in a
non-core industry; (2) a local brand in a core indus-
try; (3) a global brand in a non-core industry; and
ﬁnally (4) a global brand in a core industry.
To investigate the effects of these four types of
brand divestments on ﬁrm value, we conducted an
event study, i.e., a method that investigates whether
the announcement of an event—in this study, the sale
of a brand asset within the context of a BPR
program—creates an abnormal change in the ﬁrm’s
stock price and, hence, ﬁrm value. The stock price is
a forward-looking variable that reﬂects the present
value of all current and projected earnings of the
company. Any abnormal change in the stock price
reﬂects the effect of the event on ﬁrm value. Our
empirical ﬁndings provide evidence for our multidis-
ciplinary perspective in studying the effect of brand
divestments, which helps to understand how and
why brand divestments affect ﬁrm value.
The remainder of this article is organized as
follows: the next section presents our research
framework, followed by hypothesis development.
Subsequently, we describe the event study method-
ology and our data collection procedure. After pre-
senting the results, we conclude with a discussion of
the implications and areas for further research.
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RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Divestiture research
Research on divestitures focuses mainly on two
issues: (1) the determinants of ﬁrm divestitures; and
(2) the implications of these divestitures. To investi-
gate, this research stream has adopted a variety of
perspectives, such as the industrial organization, the
ﬁnancial accounting, and the corporate portfolio
approaches (see Hamilton and Chow, 1993). The
industrial organization approach considers a divest-
ment activity as a rational response to changing
dynamics of the general economic environment or the
industry, such as divestments due to a permanent
decrease in demand, low proﬁts, or the entry of an
aggressive competitor (Siegfried and Evans, 1994).
Financial accounting studies focus on the effects of
divestments on the ﬁnancial position of the ﬁrm, such
as its proﬁtability (e.g., Haynes et al., 2002) or share-
holder wealth (Hite and Owers, 1983). Finally, cor-
porate strategy scholars investigate how divestitures
change the conﬁguration of a ﬁrm’s business portfo-
lio (Brauer, 2006). Taken together, a diverse set of
approaches spanningmultiple levels of analysis (e.g.,
macro, industry, or ﬁrm) have been used to develop
insights into the multidisciplinary characteristics of
divestments. The adopted perspective is often based
on the motives for the divestment activity and the
relevant level of analysis. In line with the recent shift
in interest toward the ﬁrm level rather than the macro
or industry level (Brauer, 2006), this article builds on
the corporate portfolio approach in investigating the
effects of brand divestitures on shareholderwealth for
ﬁrms with large brand portfolios.
The portfolio approach
Companies can be viewed as portfolios of assets,
products, and activities (Benito, 2005), and within
these portfolios, business units compete with one
another for resources. As a consequence, ﬁrms
should systematically review their portfolios from
both a strategic and a ﬁnancial perspective
(Hamilton and Chow, 1993) and subsequently real-
locate resources between businesses to match chang-
ing business/market opportunities, build new
competitive advantages (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994),
and improve the effectiveness of their resources
(Kogut and Zander, 1992).
We can easily apply the corporate portfolio
approach to brand portfolios for several reasons.
First, many corporations offer multiple brands
within the same product category (Lei, Dawar, and
Lemmink, 2008) to serve different customer seg-
ments (Keller, 2000). Therefore, they own and
manage brand portfolios consisting of multiple
brands (Aaker, 2004; Laforet and Saunders, 1999;
Morgan and Rego, 2009). Second, in many cases,
brand divestitures are undertaken as part of a BPR
program, also called a portfolio restructuring strat-
egy. The divestiture of a brand releases resources,
which can be reallocated to the retained brands to
improve their performance (Varadarajan, DeFanti,
and Busch, 2006).
Brand characteristics and divestment motives
Within brand portfolios, ﬁrms own a variety of
brands that are offered in different industries and in
different geographical markets (Douglas, Craig, and
Nijssen, 2001). These brands can be characterized
along two dimensions: (1) the industry relatedness of
the brand (see Y-axis in Figure 1); and (2) the geo-
graphical scope of the brand (see X-axis in Figure 1).
Figure 1 graphically presents the research frame-
work of our study.
The industry relatedness of a brand refers to the
relatedness of a brand’s product line to the primary
business activities of a company. Our conceptual
deﬁnition of a brand’s industry relatedness is based
on the notion of core businesses in the diversiﬁcation
and strategy literature. The largest, strategically most
important business of the ﬁrm is referred to as its
core business (Bowen and Wiersema, 2005). Due to
several factors, such as managerial motives, increas-
ing market power, or transferring underused
resources to new businesses (Montgomery, 1994),
ﬁrms might move into new businesses and follow
different methods in how they leverage their core
skills into new markets. In the diversiﬁcation litera-
ture, expansion into markets related to a ﬁrm’s
present core activities and skills is often referred to
as related diversiﬁcation, whereas expansion into
markets unrelated to a ﬁrm’s previous activities is
referred to as unrelated diversiﬁcation (Rumelt,
1974). Relatedness has been discussed in the litera-
ture mainly at discrete levels by using concepts such
as ‘core’ and ‘non-core.’ Operationally, it is deﬁned
by four-digit standard industrial classiﬁcation (SIC)
codes of the business in which the company has the
largest percentage of its sales (e.g., Chatterjee and
Wernerfelt, 1991). The distance of a business from
the core business is typically deﬁned by the similar-
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ity between the SIC code of the core business and
that of the business in question. Relatedness is
higher (lower) when two businesses share more
(less) digits in their SIC codes (Caves, Porter, and
Spence, 1980).
A brand’s geographical scope refers to its geo-
graphical reach in terms of country markets. Various
levels of geographical scope (i.e., local, regional, and
global) can be distinguished. Global brands are mar-
keted under the same name in multiple countries,
with generally similar and centrally coordinated
marketing strategies (Yip, 1989). Brands that are
marketed in only one or a few country markets in a
particular region are referred to as local and regional
brands, respectively (Wolfe, 1991). Local brands
have a low geographical scope, while global brands
have a high geographical scope.
The decision to delete a particular brand may stem
from various divestment motives, such as poor per-
formance of a business unit (Duhaime and Grant,
1984), exiting declining industries (Davis, 1974;
Harrigan, 1980), the entry of new competitors
(Siegfried and Evans, 1994), competition in home
markets (Hutzschenreuter and Gröne, 2009), and the
necessity of meeting corporate liquidity require-
ments (Ofek, 1993). Refocusing on core businesses
appears to be the most common motive (Hoskisson
and Johnson, 1992; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992).
Firms experiencing performance declines usually
adopt a ‘refocus on the core business’ strategy (John,
Lang, and Netter, 1992). This is also prevalent in the
CPG industry, where many ﬁrms lost their focus and
have experienced performance declines (Kumar,
2003). In the international branding literature, the
adoption of global branding strategies and the devel-
opment of international brand portfolios have been
mentioned as the most important motives for MNEs
slimming down their brand portfolios (e.g., Aaker
and Joachimsthaler, 2000; Schuiling and Kapferer,
2004). Summarizing this, we consider two main
reasons why companies divest brands: (1) to refocus
on core businesses (e.g., the P&G case); and (2) to
build (strong) global brands (e.g., the Unilever case).
In Figure 1, we present these two divestment motives
and their relationship with the brand characteristic
dimensions graphically, resulting in four possible
brand divestment options.
Brand divestment options
We expect brands in the upper-right quadrant of
Figure 1, i.e., global, core brands, are the least likely
to be divested, but it sometimes happens. For
example, Diageo, the world’s largest spirits
company, sold Cinzano, the world’s second best-
selling global vermouth brand behind Martini, to the
Campari Group. This was done to reverse a down-
ward trend in the sales of their key brands such as
Smirnoff vodka and Gordon’s gin.
Another more likely option is to divest local, non-
core brands (see Figure 1, lower-left quadrant). An
example of such a case is the sales of Ambrosia, a
Global 
branding
Geographical 
scope of brands
Refocusing on core businesses
Industry 
relatedness of 
brands
Low High
Low
High
Global,
core brands
Local,
core brands
Local,
non-core brands
Global,
non-core brands
Figure 1. Characteristics of divested
brands and motives for brand
divestments
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rice pudding brand that has a particular appeal to
U.K. consumers, by Unilever. Similarly, H.J. Heinz
Company, famous for its ketchup brand, sold its
proﬁtable but local and non-core ice cream brand,
Tip Top, in New Zealand.
Interesting situations arise when the two strategic
motives do not coincide. In order to focus on core
businesses, companies may divest their non-core
brands even if they have high international presence
and geographical scope (i.e., brands in the lower-
right quadrant of Figure 1). For example, P&G
recently completed its attempt to quit the food and
beverage industry by divesting its truly global
Pringles snacks brand to focus on its core beauty and
personal care businesses. Similarly, companies may
divest brands in their core businesses to increase
focus on their global brands (i.e., brands in the
upper-left quadrant in Figure 1). For example,
during the last decade, Diageo divested many of its
local brewery and whiskey brands. These brands
were strong in their home markets, but not travelling
well across national boundaries. These sales allowed
Diageo to concentrate its resources on its global
brands like Guinness beer or Johnnie Walker
whiskey.
In this article, we study the ﬁrm value effects of
divesting brands from each of the four quadrants in
Figure 1. In the next section, we develop the hypoth-
eses for these effects.
HYPOTHESES
The value relevance of brands
Branding and brand portfolio management strategies
are important for ﬁrm value. Particularly for ﬁrms
operating in the CPG industry, the management of
brand portfolios is an integral part of the execution of
their marketing strategies (Aaker, 2004). Brands are
recognized as intangible assets that have an effect on
ﬁrm performance (e.g., Ailawadi, Lehmann, and
Neslin, 2003; Barth et al., 1998; Kallapur and Kwan,
2004). Brand portfolio characteristics, such as the
number of brands in the portfolio and the competi-
tion and relatedness between these brands, also
inﬂuence ﬁrm performance (Morgan and Rego,
2009).
Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Srivastava (2008) show
that, in the context of mergers and acquisitions, if a
ﬁrm considers selling brand assets, the transaction
value of these assets may be higher than the value-
in-use. The difference between these values depends
on the brand portfolio diversity and marketing capa-
bilities of both the acquirer and the seller. If a brand
has a better ﬁt with the brand portfolio and activities
of the acquiring company, the value of the brand is
enhanced within the new brand portfolio and such
divergent valuations between the seller and buyer
present opportunities for ﬁrm value gains for both
parties. The divestiture of a brand also releases
resources, which can be reallocated to the retained
brands to improve their performance (Varadarajan
et al., 2006). The alternative allocation of released
resources, such as launching new brands, enhancing
core brands, or expanding the reach of global brands,
may lead to (increased) growth (Carlotti, Coe, and
Perry, 2004; Kumar, 2003).
We will now link the four brand divestiture
options to ﬁrm value and argue that the value-
creating effects of divestitures depend on the
divested brands’ industry relatedness and geographi-
cal scope.
The divestment of brands with low industry
relatedness and low geographical scope
Caused by merger and acquisition activities, many
corporations have experienced diversiﬁcation in
their operating businesses. Many MNEs extended
their product range from their core businesses to
other related, or even unrelated, businesses. Empiri-
cal studies in the strategic management literature
provide evidence for negative effects of
overdiversiﬁcation on ﬁrm value (e.g., Lang and
Stulz, 1994). This is because, at some point, the
marginal costs of diversiﬁcation exceed the beneﬁts
(Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). Diversiﬁcation
then no longer improves ﬁrm performance, but
creates problems of managing an overlarge set of
business activities (Markides, 1995). In such cases,
economies of scale and scope can be achieved
through asset reduction, i.e., removing units or, in
our case, brands, in unrelated businesses to increase
the focus on core operations. This type of restructur-
ing is associated with an increase in the ﬁrm’s prof-
itability (Markides, 1995) and enhanced ﬁrm value
(Desai and Jain, 1999; John and Ofek, 1995). In line
with these considerations, we expect that such ﬁrm
value-enhancing effects also apply to divesting non-
core brand assets.
MNEs not only operate in multiple industries, but
generally also follow a multi-tier branding strategy,
i.e., they market both local and global brands. This is
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especially common when companies face difﬁculties
in reaching price sensitive segments of the market
(Schuh, 2007; Schuiling and Kapferer, 2004). A
multi-tier branding strategy allows them to enjoy
higher proﬁt margins by simultaneously targeting
premium segments with their global brands and by
better satisfying fragmented consumer needs with
local brands. However, offering (too) many brands
also increases manufacturing costs (Hill et al., 2005)
and marketing expenditures (Ehrenberg, Goodhardt,
and Barwise, 1990), and it may dilute brand loyalty
(Bawa, Landwehr, and Krishna, 1989). The prolif-
eration of brands also causes difﬁculties in managing
brands in a coordinated way (Kumar, 2003). As the
number of brands in the portfolio increases, invest-
ment and resource allocation decisions between
brands becomes a tedious task, which might lead to
a lack of support on smaller, non-core brands by top
management talent. Given these considerations,
ﬁrms adopt global branding strategies by changing
the mix of their brand offerings in favor of global
ones (e.g., Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2000; Douglas
et al., 2001; Schuiling and Kapferer, 2004;
Steenkamp, Batra, and Alden, 2003). Following
such a global branding strategy fosters ﬁrms’ inten-
tions to divest brands with a lower geographical
reach and invest released resources in enhancing
global ones. Shifting toward global brands entails
several cost-side beneﬁts. It leads to savings in pack-
aging and communication costs and it provides
economies of scale due to the standardization of
product platforms and marketing and communica-
tion strategies (Kapferer, 2002; Steenkamp et al.,
2003).
Divesting local brands in favor of global brands is
also in line with consumer responses to local and
global brands. In general, consumers pick global
brands because of affective feelings (Dimofte,
Johansson, and Ronkainen, 2008) or because these
brands are associated with higher quality, esteem,
and prestige (Holt, Quelch, and Taylor, 2004;
Johansson and Ronkainen, 2005; Steenkamp et al.,
2003). Although Steenkamp and de Jong (2010)
have shown that there is considerable heterogeneity
in attitudes toward local and global products in the
four largest economies, other studies have shown
that a huge percentage of their respondents express
strong preferences for global brands, both in devel-
oped and developing countries (Holt et al., 2004;
Strizhakova, Coulter, and Price, 2008).
In line with these arguments, we expect that the
divestment of brands with a lower geographical
scope may lead to a more efﬁcient use of retained
brand assets when compared to the divestment of
brands with a higher geographical scope. Given the
expected ﬁrm value-enhancing effects of divesting
non-core brands as well as local brands, we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Divesting brands with low industry
relatedness as well as low geographical scope
will be positively related to the firm value.
The divestment of brands with high industry
relatedness and high geographical scope
The divestment of global, core brands is least likely
to occur because, according to the widely advocated
global focus strategy, ﬁrms should aim for brand
portfolios located in the upper-right quadrant of
Figure 1 (e.g., Meyer, 2009). Nowadays, the market-
place has been witnessing a proliferation of brands,
growing retailer power, and increasing competition
of private labels. Therefore, companies need strong
core brands more than ever. A large number of ﬂag-
ship brands within the brand portfolios of many
companies are marketed in core businesses. These
are important for ﬁrms in building up solid customer
bases (Aaker, 1996; Keller, 1998) and, therefore, in
the development of strong bargaining power in their
relationships with retailers (Barwise and Robertson,
1992). Moreover, the removal of brands with high
geographical scope will not result in cost advan-
tages, because such brands already have cost advan-
tages (as marketing efforts are standardized across
countries). In fact, cost-based arguments mostly
favor the globalization strategy. We, therefore,
expect that divesting a global brand has negative
supply-side consequences for ﬁrm value.
At the demand side, with the divestiture of any
type of brand, ﬁrms run the risk of losing the market
share of the divested brands because they may fail to
migrate customers to the remaining brands in their
portfolios. Also, the retained brands may not be able
to deliver higher revenues to cover the loss of
demand for the divested brands. This might be espe-
cially true for the divestment of global, core brands.
By deﬁnition, the core business is the strategically
most important business of the company. Most suc-
cessful companies, which increase their revenues
sustainably and proﬁtably, often have strong core
businesses in which they offer their most critical
products to the potentially most proﬁtable custom-
ers. Superior proﬁtability may also be achieved
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through high market power and market share domi-
nance in core businesses (Zook and Allen, 2001).
Therefore, ﬁrm performance is more sensitive to any
loss of demand in core businesses as compared to
non-core businesses. Also, companies generally
have only one or a few global brands within a
product category (Varadarajan, DeFanti, and Busch,
2006). Global brands are perceived to be more pres-
tigious (Steenkamp et al., 2003), familiar (Özsomer,
2007), of higher quality (Holt et al., 2004), and of
higher esteem (Johansson and Ronkainen, 2005). As
a consequence, global brands usually target a
premium segment with higher proﬁt margins as com-
pared to local brands (Meyer and Tran, 2006),
leading to an increase in companies’ proﬁts
(Kapferer, 2002). Therefore, we argue that ﬁrms run
a greater risk of losing market share when they divest
a global, core brand as compared to a local, non-core
brand.
Following this reasoning, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Divesting brands with high indus-
try relatedness as well as high geographical
scope will be negatively related to the firm value.
The focus strategies combined
Hypotheses 1 and 2 discuss the consequences of
divesting brands that have low (high) scores on both
dimensions in our research framework (Figure 1).
However, as mentioned before, companies may also
divest brands that are scoring high on one of the
dimensions, but low on the other, i.e., divesting local,
core brands or global, non-core brands. The effects
of divesting such brands on ﬁrm value are less clear.
Divesting a local, core brand brings the cost advan-
tages of divesting a local brand as indicated in the
international branding literature, such as savings in
packaging and communication costs. At the same
time, it may negatively inﬂuence ﬁrm value due to
destroying a core brand. Companies generally put a
lot of managerial and ﬁnancial effort into building
strong core brands and making consumers loyal to
these brands (Aaker, 1996). Destroying such brands
will most likely give a negative signal to investors.
Whether the cost advantages of divesting a local
brand outweigh the disadvantages of divesting a core
brand is not clear in advance. The same applies for
the divestment of global, non-core brands. As we
have argued, we expect that divesting a global brand
has negative consequences for ﬁrm value, while
divesting non-core assets are generally found to be
value enhancing (John and Ofek, 1995). We, there-
fore, refrain from formulating directional hypotheses
for the divestment of local, core brands and that of
global, non-core brands and will empirically inves-
tigate these effects.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Methodology
A ﬁrm’s market value is likely to be inﬂuenced by a
large number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc events and factors with
long run implications, which are difﬁcult to be
adequately controlled for in cross-sectional research
designs. A brand divestiture is such an event with
long run implications and, therefore, we conducted
an event study to analyze the forward-looking effects
of it. Event studies allow for isolating and individu-
ally assessing the value created by events and have
been used regularly in the strategic management lit-
erature (see Wright, Chiplin, and Thompson, 1993),
as well as in the marketing and branding literature
(e.g., Gielens et al., 2008; Sood and Tellis, 2009;
Wiles, Morgan, and Rego, 2012).
In our study, we investigate the stock price reac-
tion to an announcement of a brand divestiture as
part of a ﬁrm’s BPR program. The stock price
reﬂects the present value of all current and projected
earnings of the company. Any abnormal change in
stock price, i.e., the part of the return that is not due
to systematic inﬂuences, also called abnormal return,
is associated with the unanticipated information
about an event that comes to the public realm
through an announcement. As such, it provides a
direct measure for the present value of all expected
current and future proﬁts triggered by the event, i.e.,
the brand divestiture (see Fama, 1970).
Using daily stock prices, a typical event study
analysis involves extracting daily abnormal returns
(ARs) for a time period around the event dates of
interest, aggregating these ARs over an event
window to compute the cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs), and running additional regressions to
explain cross-sectional variation in the CARs for a
sample of events. The next subsections describe the
basics of an event study and some design issues in
our application. For a more extensive overview of
the event study methodology, we refer to Brown and
Warner (1985).
The abnormal return (ARit) (see Equation 1) for a
security i on day t is expressed as the difference
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between actual return (Rit) and the predicted normal
return (E(Rit)). The predicted normal return is the
return that would be expected if the event had not
taken place. Typically, normal returns can be
modeled using the market model. Alternative normal
return models like multifactor and portfolio models
have been proposed (for an extensive discussion of
normal return models, see Kothari and Warner,
2006). In our study, we found that applying such
alternative models yield highly similar results to
those of the market model and we, therefore, decided
to use the latter. The market model relates the
expected return to a single factor being the return
from a benchmark portfolio (Rmt) over an estimation
period (see Equation 2). As a next step, the indi-
vidual days’ ARs are aggregated over an event
window from t1 to t2 to ﬁnd the CAR (see Equation
3).
AR R E Rit it it= − ( ) (1)
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Next, the CARs are averaged across N events into
a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). The
signiﬁcance of the CAARs for different event
windows is computed using the standardized test
statistic described by Patell (1976). Assuming cross-
sectional independence, the test estimates a separate
standard error for each event, and each abnormal
return is then standardized as follows:
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where Ti is the number of days in the estimation
window starting at E1 and ending at E2, Rm Est, is the
mean market return over the estimation window.
For each event i, we estimated the expected
returns for the market model using an estimation
period of 255 days (which equals one trading year),
ending 30 days before the event date. We used
adjusted share prices, as some ﬁrms had undergone
stock splits from 1995 to 2010. To quantify the
market rate of return, we collected index returns. For
ﬁrms that had their common stocks included in mul-
tiple indices, we chose the index registered in the
home country of the ﬁrm. Stock prices and informa-
tion on indices were drawn from the Thomson
Reuters database.
The choice of an event window is one of the most
important design issues in an event study. Including
pre-event days in the event window accounts for
leakage of information prior to the ofﬁcial
announcement, while including post-event dates
ensures capturing the delayed impact of the
announcement. However, using longer event
windows increases the likelihood of confounding
events and may lead to biased results. Therefore, we
report the CAARs for several different narrow event
windows around the event date, namely, (−3,+1),
(−3,0), (−2,+1), (−2,0), (−1,+1), (−1,0), and (0,+1).
We use parametric (Patell Z test) and nonparametric
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) tests to determine the
signiﬁcance of the CAARs.
Sample design and descriptive statistics
The empirical setting of our study is the food and
beverage industry. To construct a sample of brand
divestiture announcements of multinational enter-
prises operating in this industry, we followed a step-
wise approach: (1) we identiﬁed sample ﬁrms; (2)
we collected brand asset divestiture announcements
for those ﬁrms; (3) we screened the announcements
for the objective of the divestment activity; and (4)
we checked for confounding events. Next we
describe in detail how we developed our sample.
First, we identiﬁed all publicly listed multina-
tional enterprises that appeared in the 2010 list of the
Global Food Market Database. This list ranks the
Top 100 global food groups by revenue in the food
and beverage industry. We then collected announce-
ments of these ﬁrms by using the database of Lexis
Nexis, which covers a multitude of information
sources. Since many corporations started to engage
in brand disposal activities in the late 1990s (Kumar,
2003), we started gathering announcements as of
1995 until 2010. Multiple search terms (e.g., sale,
sell, sold, disposal, divesture, divestment, deletion,
brand, rationalization, portfolio, focus) were used to
identify relevant announcements. Afterward, we
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scanned all articles to select the ones that included an
announcement of brand asset divestitures. We then
used Thomson One Banker’s M&A Deals Analysis
module to conﬁrm that the transaction had actually
been enacted. Announcements of pending or can-
celled transactions were excluded.
To separate BPR announcements from divesti-
tures with other strategic objectives, we used an
approach similar to Markides’ (1992) and Byerly,
Lamont, and Keasler’s (2003) to identify restructur-
ing announcements. We screened all announcements
for content and selected those that reported a brand
portfolio restructuring strategy by looking for terms
such as ‘refocusing,’ ‘concentrate on (shifting focus
to) core businesses,’ ‘concentrate on (shifting focus
to) core brands,’ ‘concentrate on (shifting focus to)
core markets,’ ‘concentrate on (shifting focus to)
global markets,’ or some other wording clearly
revealing that the divestment was executed within
the context of a BPR program and in order to focus
on other brands in the portfolio. Finally, we exam-
ined our sample for confounding events and ﬁltered
out those with a confounding event from three days
before to three days after the announcement. By
doing this, we ensured that the stock price reactions
could be attributed solely to the announced brand
divestitures. This resulted in a sample of 205 BPR
announcements.
Next, we classiﬁed the 205 events according to the
geographic scope and industry relatedness of the
divested brands. In Table 1, we describe the
operationalization of these variables. We introduced
regional brands as a separate category because for
many of the divested brands in our sample it was not
possible to classify them as either local or global in
an unambiguous way.
To determine the geographical scope of the
divested brand, we adopted conceptual and opera-
tional deﬁnitions similar to those of Townsend,
Yeniyurt, and Talay (2009). We classify the divested
brand as being a: (1) local brand; (2) regional brand;
or (3) global brand. For all divested brands, we
scannedLexisNexis to ﬁnd information regarding the
country markets where the divested brands were
present. To determine the industry relatedness of the
divested brands, we compared the standard industrial
classiﬁcation (SIC) codes of the divested units with
the primary SIC codes of the divesting companies.
This approach is in line with other studies in divest-
ment research (e.g., Doukas and Kan, 2004;
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002). We dis-
tinguish between divestitures in core (i.e., high relat-
edness) business and non-core (i.e., low relatedness)
business activities. The SIC codes for the divested
units are collected from Thomson One Banker’s
M&ADealsAnalysis module, while the primary SIC
codes are collected from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis
database.
Table 2 (Panel A) presents an overview of the
sample sizes for the different levels of the divested
brands’ geographical scope and industry relatedness.
We observe a decrease in the number of divested
cases, with an increase in the geographical scope and
in the industry relatedness of the divested brand.
Table 1. List of variables, operationalization, and sources
Variable Levels and operationalization Sources
Geographical scope of
the divested brand
Local brand: divested brand is present only in one
country
Announcement dataset
compiled from Lexis Nexis
Regional brand: divested brand is present in
multiple countries in one of the three parts (i.e.,
North America, Europe, Asia-Paciﬁc) of the
triad
Global brand: divested brand is present in multiple
countries in at least two different parts of the
triad
Industry relatedness of
the divested brand
Core business brand: divested unit and divesting
company shares a common three-digit SIC code
Thomson One Banker M&A
Deals Analysis Module,
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis databaseNon-core business brand: divested unit and
divesting company do not share a common
three-digit SIC code
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About half of the cases involve the divestiture of
local brands, followed by regional brands (28% of
the cases). The divestiture of global brands occurs in
less than 20 percent of the cases. Furthermore, 60
percent of the divested brands are non-core business
brands, while 40 percent are core business brands.
As expected, the divestment of brands with low
relatedness and low geographical scope appeared
most frequently. The divestments of brands with
high relatedness and high geographical scope were
rare events; the removal of global, core business
brands appeared in only four percent of all cases in
our sample. Overall, we observe a substantial
number of non-core business, global brand divesti-
tures and core business, local brand divestitures.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Hypotheses testing
To test our hypotheses, we analyze the CARs for the
divestiture of brands with three levels of geographi-
cal scope—i.e., local, regional, and global—and two
levels of industry relatedness—i.e., core and non-
core. Table 3 presents these CARs for varying event
windows and different test statistics.
Hypothesis 1 states that the divestiture of brands
with low relatedness and low geographical scope
will enhance ﬁrm value. This is conﬁrmed by the
results in Table 3. For the divestment of local, non-
core brands, we indeed ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive
effects for all reported event windows. In contrast,
but as expected, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative effects
on ﬁrm value for the divestment of global, core
brands for all but one reported event window. This
conﬁrms Hypothesis 2.
For the divestment options in the off-diagonal
quadrants in Figure 1, i.e., local, core brands and
global, non-core brands, we did not formulate
hypotheses in advance. The CARs in Table 3 reveal
that both divestment options destroy value. The
effects are strongest for the local, core brand
divestments.
For the divestments of regional brands, we
observe a similar pattern as for the divestment of
local brands. The divestment of regional, core brands
has a negative impact on ﬁrm value, while the divest-
ment of regional, non-core brands has a positive
effect. Both effects are signiﬁcant for four out of the
seven reported event windows.
In sum, the cumulative abnormal returns reported
in Table 3 demonstrate that divesting core business
brands has a negative effect on ﬁrm value regardless
of the divested brand’s geographical scope. Divest-
ing non-core brands also has a negative effect in the
case of global brands (for three event windows).
However, the divestment of non-core brands has a
positive impact on ﬁrm value in the case of local (for
all event windows) and regional (for four event
windows) brands. Our results clearly emphasize the
importance of integrating the two strategic perspec-
tives, i.e., the divested brand’s industry relatedness
and its geographical scope, in a single common
framework.
The reported CARs in the analysis are measured
as the percentage change in share price after it has
Table 2. Brand divestitures: frequency and effect sizes among different levels of geographical scope and industry
relatedness
Panel A: Frequency of different type of brand divestitures
Local brands Regional brands Global brands Total
Core business brands 51 22 8 81
Non-core business brands 57 36 31 124
Total 108 58 39 205
Panel B: Magnitude of effect sizes: mean scores in $ millions (event window (−3, +1))
Local brands Regional brands Global brands Total
Core business brands −104.36 −49.76 −299.72 −108.83
Non-core business brands 301.66 295.77 −35.96 215.54
Total 109.93 164.71 −90.07 87.38
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Table 3. Mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) with respect to geographical scope and industry relatedness
Panel A: Local brands (N = 108)
Event window
(−3,+1) (−3,0) (−2,+1) (−2,0) (−1,+1) (−1,0) (0,+1)
Core business brands (N = 51)
Mean CAR −0.746 −0.458 −0.853 −0.565 −0.920 −0.632 −0.624
Z-valuea −1.95† −1.51 −2.18* −1.75† −2.36* −1.95† −1.93†
% of positive CARs 29.41 33.33 29.41 31.37 25.49 23.53 29.41
Z-valueb −2.54* −1.99* −3.29*** −2.79** −3.42*** −2.94** −3.07**
Non-core business brands (N = 57)
Mean CAR 0.824 0.716 0.830 0.723 0.906 0.798 0.567
Z-valuea 1.78† 1.96† 1.99* 2.16* 2.42* 2.78** 1.87†
% of positive CARs 59.65 59.65 66.67 70.18 66.67 71.93 61.40
Z-valueb 1.74† 2.13* 2.66** 3.29*** 3.31*** 4.03*** 2.04*
Panel B: Regional brands (N = 58)
Event window
(−3,+1) (−3,0) (−2,+1) (−2,0) (−1,+1) (−1,0) (0,+1)
Core business brands (N = 22)
Mean CAR −0.667 −0.442 −0.730 −0.505 −0.813 −0.588 −0.652
Z-valuea −1.38 −0.96 −1.85† −1.45 −2.35* −2.05** −2.32*
% of positive CARs 31.82 27.27 31.82 36.36 31.82 27.27 36.36
Z-valueb −1.87† −1.38 −1.74† −1.06 −2.35* −1.67† −1.80†
Non-core business brands (N = 36)
Mean CAR 0.861 0.607 1.053 0.800 0.799 0.545 0.525
Z-valuea 1.70† 1.05 2.22* 1.58 2.22* 1.51 1.81†
% of positive CARs 61.11 55.56 61.11 55.56 66.67 55.56 58.33
Z-valueb 1.87† 1.12 1.96* 1.24 2.31* 1.45 2.00*
Panel C: Global brands (N = 39)
Event window
(−3,+1) (−3,0) (−2,+1) (−2,0) (−1,+1) (−1,0) (0,+1)
Core business brands (N = 8)
Mean CAR −1.386 −1.453 −1.458 −1.525 −0.858 −0.925 −0.076
Z-valuea −1.88† −2.04* −2.06* −2.32* −1.70† −2.01* −0.92
% of positive CARs 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 0.00 25.00 37.50
Z-valueb N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Non-core business brands (N = 31)
Mean CAR −0.333 −0.424 −0.542 −0.633 −0.658 −0.749 −0.158
Z-valuea −0.30 −0.66 −1.12 −1.67† −1.66† −2.50* −0.67
% of positive CARs 48.39 48.39 48.39 48.39 48.39 41.94 45.16
Z-valueb −0.43 −0.41 −0.94 −0.71 −0.55 −0.61 −0.61
†p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
aPatell z-statistic (Patell, 1976) is used to test for the statistical significance of CARs.
bZ-values are derived from Wilcoxon’s signed rank test statistic.
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been adjusted for changes resulting from general
market movements. To provide insight into the mag-
nitude of the monetary value of the implied perfor-
mance effects, we calculated the monetary effect
sizes across all events belonging to a particular type
of brand divestment (see Table 2, Panel B). Effect
sizes in monetary value are calculated by multiply-
ing the CAR for the longest event window (-3, +1)
with the market capitalization of the ﬁrm, which is
calculated by multiplying a company’s number of
outstanding shares with the current market price of
one share. In our analysis, the number of outstanding
shares stays constant during the event window,
because we excluded announcements with con-
founding events such as stock splits, dividends/
distributions, and right offerings. Therefore, the
percentage change in the market price of one share
can be directly translated to a percentage change in
the market capitalization of the ﬁrm.
The results in Table 2 (Panel B) are in line with
the reported mean CARs for each type of divestment.
Deleting core brands leads to an average decrease in
market capitalization of $108.83 million, while
deleting non-core brands leads to an average
increase in market capitalization of $215.54 million.
Deleting non-core, global brands, however, entails a
decrease in market capitalization of $35.96 million.
Only in the case of deleting a local or regional,
non-core brand, do we ﬁnd a positive effect on the
market capitalization.
In a subsequent cross-sectional analysis, we con-
trolled for the effect of the divested brand’s relative
size, calculated as the ratio of the prior year sales of
the divested brand relative to the prior year sales of
the divesting ﬁrm. The data on brand sales were
mainly gathered from the announcements, but, in
some cases, companies’ ﬁnancial reports were used.
We do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant effect for the
relative size of the divested brand and, moreover,
controlling for this effect does not change the main
ﬁndings of our study.
Post hoc analysis
Our results show that, on average, ﬁrms experience
negative abnormal returns due to the divestment of
core brands, even if the removed brand has a low
geographical scope (i.e., local and regional brands).
Apparently, the advantages of divesting a local (or
regional) brand do not outweigh the disadvantages of
divesting a core brand or, alternatively, divesting
local (and regional) brands may entail severe disad-
vantages. However, in practice, many ﬁrms experi-
ence proliferation not only in their non-core
businesses, but in their core businesses as well. Fur-
thermore, as shown in Table 2 (Panel A), removing
core business brands with low geographical scope is
one of the most common forms of focus-increasing
divestitures (i.e., about 36% of all cases in our data).
Therefore, it is important to understand why divest-
ing local and regional brands in core businesses
have, on average, negative effects. We next offer two
explanations.
First, certain local brands may have a very par-
ticular ‘appeal’ to local customers; they may be per-
ceived as highly esteemed, and familiar and,
therefore, have a strong and loyal consumer base
(Schuiling and Kapferer, 2004). Moreover, local
brands may have strong appeals in their home
markets due to their perceived local iconness, i.e.,
the extent to which a brand is perceived as a symbol
of the local culture and tradition. In food categories,
which are the focus of this article, local icons are
perceived to be of higher quality. Further, a close
connection to national identity, local culture, and
heritage may enhance a brand’s prestige which, in
turn, may increase the purchase likelihood of the
local brand (Özsomer, 2012). Therefore, a local
brand’s contribution to top-line performance might
seem limited, but once-divested companies may fail
to migrate these brands’ customers to other core
business brands. As a result, beneﬁts of such dives-
titures may not go beyond cost saving, and revenues
also suffer. A second explanation may be that, due to
an information advantage, companies can better
identify consumer needs and their buying behaviors
in their ‘home regions’ than in away regions. For
example, there might be a negative effect of cultural
distance on products related to national identity (e.g.,
food) or products carrying country-speciﬁc quality
associations (e.g., wines) (Ghemawat, 2001). Better
understanding of the local culture, tastes, and needs
helps local brands in delivering higher quality and
higher prestige products (Özsomer, 2012). Compa-
nies have an apparent advantage in building and
managing local brands in their home regions because
assets (like knowledge of the local culture) are accu-
mulated relatively more easily in home markets than
in away markets. Moreover, home region brands
tend to be managed more effectively and monitored
more closely by the best managers because of geo-
graphic proximity to the head ofﬁce. Therefore, in
their home regions, they can offer brands that meet
consumer needs more effectively. After the divesti-
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ture of such brands, retained brands may not regain
the lost market share. Moreover, in such cases, any
top-line drop due to the loss of divested brands’
demand is likely to have negative effects on bottom-
line performance, since companies usually have
higher proﬁt margins in their home regions
(McGahan and Victer, 2010).
We ran cross-sectional regressions to examine the
effect of these two variables on the abnormal returns
due to divesting core brands with low geographical
scope. For this purpose, we took the subsample of 73
announcements of the divestment of local and
regional core brands (see Table 2, Panel A). To
operationalize brand appeal to consumers, we used
information from the announcement. We looked for
terms such as ‘well known,’ ‘iconic,’ ‘familiar,’ or
‘esteemed’ to code our dummy variable ‘Appeal,’
which takes the value of ‘1’ when the divested brand
is appealing to consumers. To operationalize the
variable ‘Home region,’ we categorized brands
according to the geographical markets in which they
were present and then compared this to the geo-
graphical location of the company. If these two geo-
graphical locations were the same, the dummy
variable was coded as ‘1.’We also include a dummy
variable to indicate whether the brand is local (=1) or
regional (=0). The results of these regression analy-
ses are reported in Table 4.
In line with our expectations, the results indicate
that divesting a brand with a particular appeal to
consumers has a signiﬁcant negative effect on ﬁrm
value. The same applies for the divestment of a home
region brand. Home region brands may address cus-
tomer needs better than away region brands and we,
therefore, argue that divesting home region brand
assets can be more risky than divesting away region
brand assets.
CONCLUSION
Discussion of findings
In this article, we have empirically investigated the
effects of focus-increasing brand divestitures using a
multidisciplinary perspective. Previous studies on
divestitures focused on the effects of divesting either
non-core business assets (strategic management/
divestment literature) or local brands (international
branding literature). This study contributes to both
literatures by investigating the stock market’s reac-
tion to a ﬁrm’s brand divestment activities and by
showing that both brand divestment characteristics,
i.e., core versus non-core and local/regional versus
global, in parallel determine the value-creating/
destroying effects of such divestments. Moreover, in
line with Meyer (2006), who discusses the beneﬁts
of a global focus strategy, this is the ﬁrst study that
provides empirical evidence for the positive effects
of such a strategy. We show that divesting brands
scoring low on both industry relatedness and geo-
graphical scope (i.e., the local/regional, non-core
Table 4. Cross-sectional regressions (sub sample N = 73) of local and regional brands in core businesses
Dependent variable
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
(−3,+1) (−3,0) (−2,+1) (−2,0) (−1,+1) (−1,0) (0,+1)
Independent variable
Intercept 0.816 0.843 0.448 0.474 0.042 0.068 −0.059
(0.61) (0.57) (0.52) (0.44) (0.41) (0.35) (0.38)
APPEAL −1.331* −1.252* −1.139* −1.060** −1.063** −0.983** −0.664*
(0.55) (0.51) (0.47) (−0.39) (0.37) (0.31) (0.34)
HOME REGION −1.720** −1.416** −1.304** −1.000* −0.769* −0.465 −0.591†
(0.56) (0.53) (0.48) (0.41) (0.38) (0.32) (0.35)
LOCAL 0.204 0.230 0.101 0.128 0.058 0.084 0.142
(0.60) (0.56) (0.51) (0.43) (0.40) (0.34) (0.37)
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.06
F-statistic 5.67*** 4.93*** 5.02*** 4.90*** 4.66*** 4.46*** 2.49*
† p < 0.10. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
For each independent variable, unstandardized coefficients are reported. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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brands) increases ﬁrm value, while the opposite is
true for brand divestments that score high on both
dimensions.
We show that divesting non-core brands in order
to focus on core brands creates ﬁrm value, but only if
the divested brands are local or regional ones. We
cannot see the same positive effect for divesting
global, non-core brands.Actually, for three out of the
seven event windows, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
impact of divesting a global, non-core brand. For the
other event windows, we also ﬁnd a negative param-
eter, though not signiﬁcant. Our results suggest that
divesting a non-core brand does not always enhance
ﬁrm value. Although the divestment of a non-core,
global brand happens in a minority of the cases in
our sample (15%), it is an interesting ﬁnding and
contributes to the divestment literature. So far, this
literature showed only value-enhancing effects of
divesting non-core assets (Daley, Mehrotra, and
Sivakumar, 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; John and
Ofek, 1995). By also taking into account the geo-
graphical scope of the divested brand asset, we
develop a more nuanced picture.
Divesting a global brand appears, on average, to
lead to negative reactions from investors, whether
the brand is a core or non-core business brand.
Apparently, the value of global brands, due to the
economies of scale in production, R&D, and mar-
keting as well as the economies of scope, is high
(Hankinson and Cowking, 1996), leading ﬁrm value
to decrease when divesting such brands.
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst empirical study
showing that the strategy advocated in the interna-
tional branding literature to divest brands with low
geographical scope in order to focus more on strong
global brands (see e.g., Kumar, 2003) will not
always create positive ﬁrm value. When taking into
account the industry relatedness of the divested
brand, we see a different picture. The divestment of
local and regional, core business brands appears, on
average, to destroy ﬁrm value. Although global
brands offer numerous advantages, such as cost efﬁ-
ciencies, they may fail to appeal to local tastes. The
attitude toward local products is still ubiquitous in
many countries (Steenkamp and de Jong, 2010).
Local brands, especially in core businesses, gener-
ally have high brand equity because they are well
known in their markets and develop a true local value
by responding to local needs. Consequently, local
consumers often have strong relationships and emo-
tional ties with these brands (Steenkamp et al., 2003;
Schuiling and Kapferer, 2004). If a company sells a
local, core business brand to another company, con-
sumers may be hesitant to give up their favorite local
brands just because the owner has been changed.
Alternatively, replacing them with global brands
may not warrant customers’ switching to this global
brand. For example, when P&G gave up the local
dishwasher detergent ‘Fairy’ for its global brand
‘Dawn’ in Germany, the company’s market share in
dishwashing detergent fell. The global brand that
replaced ‘Fairy’ received an unanticipated negative
reaction from consumers who were strongly tied to
the once popular ‘Fairy’ brand; even reverting to the
original ‘Fairy’ brand name did not bring the brand
back to its former glory (Kapferer, 2008).
The results of our post hoc analyses provide more
insight into this negative effect of divesting local/
regional, core brands, and show that if the divested
brand is appealing, this negatively inﬂuences the
abnormal return. Furthermore, the divestment of
core brands with limited geographical scope has
more dramatic consequences when undertaken in
home regions. One possible explanation is that com-
panies are more likely to offer very effective brands
in their home regions than in away regions because
they are better informed about these home regions
consumers’ needs and preferences. Home regions
are often the markets where companies have been
active the longest time. Such tenure of operations has
been found to be positively related to organizational
knowledge (Benito and Gripsrud, 1992). This makes
it more likely that they build strong and loyal cus-
tomer bases and enjoy higher proﬁt margins for
home region brands than for brands in foreign
regions.
Managerial implications
Our ﬁndings yield important implications for man-
agers who are responsible for brand portfolios and
who consider brand divestments. In practice, brand
managers are often reluctant to make brand divest-
ment decisions. The reasons can be many, including
fear of losing jobs, being hesitant in admitting failure
of a brand, or the managers’ emotional ties with the
divested brands. Moreover, most brand managers
give high consideration to developing strategies to
enhance their brands’ performance, but they may
have little or no concern about whether other busi-
nesses of the company have more proﬁtable uses for
the resources of their brands.
Our study clearly shows that in certain instances,
focus-increasing brand asset sales may increase ﬁrm
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value. However, our results also demonstrate that
divesting brands can be risky as well. If we look at
the strategies of P&G and Unilever as outlined in the
beginning of this article, we conclude that both strat-
egies bear the risk of destroying ﬁrm value. P&G
divested non-core brands in order to focus on their
core businesses, and they even divested global
brands (e.g., Pringles) for this purpose.We show that
such divestments certainly do not lead to positive
reactions from investors and might even entail a
negative impact on ﬁrm value. Unilever divested
mainly local and regional brands in order to reduce
the number of brands and shifted its resources to
fewer important global brands. Our study shows that
this strategy increases ﬁrm value only if non-core
brands are divested, and destroys value if core
brands are divested.
Our study indicates a single pathway when com-
panies are faced with problems of proliferated brand
portfolios, i.e., refocusing and internationalization
forces to act in the same direction. More speciﬁcally,
looking from a ﬁrm value perspective, non-core
business brands with low international presence
should be the primary candidates for divestitures,
while divesting core or global brands should be
avoided.
To summarize, companies should rationalize their
offerings toward a portfolio that follow a multi-tier
branding strategy in core businesses. Many leading
CPG companies offer a collection of local, regional,
and global brands in their core businesses. For
example, Kraft Foods’ portfolio of brands includes
several local (e.g., Opavia biscuit in Czech Repub-
lic), regional (e.g., LU biscuit in Western Europe),
and global (e.g., Oreo biscuit all over the world)
brands in their core snacks and confectionary busi-
ness. Similarly, Diageo’s portfolio of brands include
some local beer brands such as Serengeti Premium
in Tanzania, regional brands such as Tusker in
Africa, and a global Smithwick’s brand that is sold
in North America, Europe, and Australia. Another
company that successfully manages a portfolio of
local and global brands is Anheuser-Busch InBev
(Steenkamp and de Jong, 2010). Such an approach
allows them to enjoy higher proﬁt margins by target-
ing premium segments with global brands and to
enjoy greater market share by better satisfying frag-
mented consumer needs with their local brands. This
is especially important in their home regions. Com-
panies have higher earning margins in both core
businesses and home regions. In other words, sim-
pliﬁcation should be avoided in industry and country
markets where earning margins are high. Otherwise,
the possible demand losses after divestitures may
hurt bottom-line growth. For non-core business
activities, companies should pursue a global brand-
ing strategy only.
Future research
This study focused on brand asset sales in the food
and beverages industry. First, future research could
focus on similar divestitures in other industries to
determine whether our results generalize beyond the
current setting. Second, we used stock prices to
operationalize the change in the ﬁrm value and,
therefore, we focus on the return at the aggregate
ﬁrm level. Future research could reveal the perfor-
mance effects of brand divestments by linking them
to a multitude of other ﬁnancial performance indica-
tors, such as revenues, operating margins, advertis-
ing expenses, and employee efﬁciency. Third, due to
data considerations, we used only a limited number
of variables that characterize the brand portfolios
and divested brands. However, a wider range of
brand- (e.g., strategic role, age, modiﬁability) and
brand portfolio-level factors (e.g., degree of canni-
balization, intra-portfolio competition, the number
and strengths of the retained brands in the selling
ﬁrm’s portfolio) could moderate the effects of focus-
increasing brand divestiture decisions. The study by
Varadarajan et al. (2006) provides a comprehensive
list of such factors that trigger these decisions.
Further research could assess their value relevance.
Finally, an interesting extension could be looking at
abnormal returns in the stock value of the acquiring
ﬁrms to ﬁnd out how acquiring ﬁrms beneﬁt from
core/non-core and local/global brand acquisitions.
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